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Summary. In this paper I consider a model of coexisting moral hazard and
adverse selection, similar to one considered by Guesnerie, Picard, and Rey
(1989). I provide an explicit solution for the optimal incentive scheme in the
case, when the eﬀort is observed with a normally distributed error. The main
observation is that in this case the optimal incentive scheme often fails to
be monotone. If the monotonicity constraint is imposed on the solution for
economic reasons there would exist a region of proﬁt realizations, such that
the optimal compensation will be independent of on performance.
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11 Introduction
Many real life situations can be described as agency relationship. Of-
ten the agent has to provide and unobservable action on the behalf of the
principal and also possesses a payoﬀ relevant private information. Below,
for concreteness, I will call the unobservable action eﬀort and the hidden
information the type of the agent. Models of coexisting hidden action and
hidden information were pioneered by Laﬀont and Tirole (1986) and later
developed by Picard (1987), Rogerson (1988), Guesnerie, Picard, and Rey
(1989), Melumad and Reichelstein (1989), and Caillaud, Guesnerie, and Ray
(1992).
I will use the following framework, rather common in this literature. As-
sume that both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral and the agent
has to undertake a task on behalf of the principal. To do this, she has to
e x e r ts o m ee ﬀort. The cost of eﬀort is the private information of the agent.
The principal cannot observe eﬀort directly. However, a signal equal to eﬀort
plus a normally distributed white noise, which is uncorrelated with the type
of the agent, is publicly observable.
The usual way to solve such problems is to proceed in two steps. First,
assume that the eﬀort is contractible and solve the adverse selection problem.
2The result will be a wage schedule conditional on the eﬀort level. To imple-
ment the same eﬀort at the same cost when the eﬀort is not contractible, the
principal has to ﬁnd a wage schedule, which depends only on the observable
signal such that the expectation of this schedule conditional on the eﬀort
gives the schedule found at stage one.
Under an assumption that the solution to the ﬁr s ts t a g ep r o b l e mi sa n -
alytical, I will ﬁnd the explicit solution to the complete problem, expressed
as a converging power series. From the explicit formula, one will be able to
immediately deduce that for a wide range of the solutions of stage one, the
solution to the complete problem is represented by a non-monotone wage
schedule (this will happen, for example, if the solution to the ﬁrst stage is
given by a monomial of a power of at least two).
The possibility of non-monotone wage schedules in pure moral hazard sit-
uations was long recognized. The usual reason is the failure of the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP). Note, however, that failure of monotonic-
ity here has noting to do with MLRP. Indeed, had the cost of eﬀort been
observable, the optimal contract would simply have sold the enterprise to
the agent, making her the residual claimant on the stream of proﬁts. Such
a contract is clearly monotone in performance. The optimal wage schedule
3obtained on the ﬁrst stage, on the other hand, is also always a monotone
function of eﬀort. Therefore, non-monotonicity here is a result of interac-
tion of hidden action and hidden information components. To understand
the intuition behind this result, recall that in pure hidden action situations,
though the principal knows the agent’s choice of eﬀort in equilibrium, the
optimal incentive scheme is best understood if one assumes that the prin-
cipal uses the agent’s performance to form a statistical inference about her
eﬀort. Similarly, to understand the features of the optimal incentive scheme
in this case, let us assume that the principal uses the agent’s performance
to form a statistical inference about her eﬀort and her type. Then a higher
level of proﬁt signals a higher eﬀort, which is a reason to increase the reward,
but it also signals a lower cost of eﬀort, which is a reason to decrease the
compensation. The interaction between these two inferences can easily lead
to a non-monotone incentive schemes.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, I introduce
the model and derive the master integral equation. In Section 3, I solve
the equation explicitly and study the properties of the solution. Section 4
concludes.
42T h e m o d e l
Consider a principal and an agent, both of whom are risk neutral with
respect to money, who are engaged in a following type of a transaction. An
agent undertakes an eﬀort, z, that generates expected utility π(z) for the
principal. The eﬀort is unobservable, however, one can observe a signal x,
where
x = z + ε. (1)
Here ε is a normally distributed variable with zero mean.
The cost of eﬀort, c(·;θ), is assumed to be increasing, convex, twice diﬀer-
entiable, and satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition, i.e. czθ < 0.. It depends
on both the eﬀort level, z, and the type of the agent, θ. Parameter θ is pri-
vate information of the agent. However, the principal knows that it comes
from a distribution with a continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly positive on
its support density g(·). The support of the distribution is assumed to be a
segment [θ,θ],w h e r e0 ≤ θ < θ ≤∞ .D e n o t eb yG(·) is the corresponding
cumulative distribution function.
5Deﬁne function V (z,θ) by




Assume that for any θ ∈ [θ,θ] the maximizer of V (·,θ) is unique and that
V (·,·) supermodular in (z,θ). The last assumption, in particular, rules out
the possibility of partial pooling, i.e. of several diﬀerent types supplying the
same eﬀort in equilibrium. The lack of pooling is a necessary condition for
the optimal wage schedule under observable eﬀo r tt ob ea n a l y t i c a l .
Let us ﬁrst consider an auxiliary problem, in which the choice of eﬀort is
observable.
2.1 The case of the observable eﬀort
In this subsection I will concentrate on the case of observable eﬀort, i.e. I
assume that the principal faces a pure hidden information problem. In that
case the analysis is standard and the assumptions made above imply that
the optimal eﬀort schedule, z(θ), solves:
z(θ)=a r gm a xV (z,θ). (3)
6For a discussion, see Mussa and Rosen (1978). Deﬁne the agent’s surplus,











Intuitively, assume that the principal has to compensate the agent for the
cost of eﬀort and leave her information rents ξ(θ). If she wants to induce
level of eﬀort z, she selects the type for which the total cost of inducing this
eﬀort is minimal.
2.2 The case of the unobservable eﬀort
In the case of unobservable eﬀort the principal will be able achieve the
same eﬀort-type allocation at the same expected cost as in the observable
7eﬀort case, if she chooses a wage schedule, w(·), to solve:
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is the normal density function and v(·) is deﬁned by (5). Indeed, faced with
such a wage proﬁle the agent’s expected payment conditional on exerting
eﬀort z is v(z). Since the agent is risk neutral she ends up solving the same
problem as in the case of the observable eﬀort. The same is true about the
principal’s payoﬀs.
I will refer below to equation (6) as the master equation.I ti saﬁrst type
Fredholm integral equation. For an analysis of the existence of a solution
for this class of equations under a general set of conditions see, for example,
Pogorzelski (1966). In this paper I will be concerned with ﬁnding explicit
solutions for a broad class of wage-eﬀort schedules.
83 The properties of the explicit solution of
the master equation
Let us assume, for simplicity, that σ2 =1 /2. This can be done without
loss of generality, since the general case can be reduced to it by an appropriate







2)dx = v(z). (8)
Let us ﬁnd the solution of equation (8) in the case when the right hand side
is represented by a monomial, i.e.
v(z)=az
n, (9)
where n ∈ N. A solution for the stage one problem is given by (9) with









9Let us look for a solution of equation (8) in a form:
w(x)=cHn(x), (13)






(see, Pugachev and Sinitsyn, 1999). Substituting (13) into (8) one obtains:
cIn(z)=z
n, (15)









Using deﬁnition (14) and integrating (16) by parts one can prove that In(z)
solves:





and c = 1




Finally, if function v(·) is analytical at zero, i.e. in some neighborhood of













Let me write down explicit formulae for the wage schedule for small values










2 − 1).( 2 4 )
Observe, that for n>1 the optimal wage proﬁle is not monotone. One can
see it explicitly, for n =2and 3. In general, it follows from the well-known
property of the Hermitian polynomials that all their roots are distinct and
real (see, Pugachev and Sinitsyn, 1999). Therefore, there are n diﬀerent
proﬁt realizations for which the wage will be zero. For example, if n =1the
wage is zero if and only if the proﬁti sz e r o ,i fn =2t h ew a g ei sz e r ow h e n




2, when n =3t h ew a g ei sz e r o
when the proﬁt is in the set {−1,0,1}, etc.
One can see from the above analysis that the optimal wage is often non-
monotone. If the monotonicity constraint has to be imposed for some eco-
nomic reasons, for example, because the agent can costlessly destroy the
output, the optimal wage schedule will have a ﬂat region, i.e. there will exist
an open set of proﬁt levels over which the wage is constant. Such contracts
can be approximated by a ﬁxed wage contract with a bonus for an outstand-
12ing performance and a penalty for a dismal one. It is straightforward to
observe that if the monotonicity constraint binds hidden action leads to the
additional welfare losses comparatively to the hidden information case. Note
that the reason here is diﬀerent from the example in Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005), where the additional welfare losses arise from the fact that the pro-
duction noise is correlated with type. For another example along similar lines
see Basov and Bardsley (2005).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper I consider a model of coexisting moral hazard and adverse
selection, similar to one considered by Guesnerie, Picard, and Rey (1989).
I provide an explicit solution for the optimal incentive scheme in the case,
when the eﬀort is observed with a normally distributed error. The main
observation is that in this case the optimal incentive scheme often fails to
be monotone. As explained in the Introduction, the intuition for this result
is rather intricate and has to do with a subtle interaction between the hid-
den action and hidden information dimensions of the problem. The formal
derivation, on the other hand is rather straightforward.
13If the monotonicity constraint is imposed on the solution for economic
reasons there would exist a region of proﬁt realizations, such that the optimal
compensation not dependent on performance. The optimal compensation
scheme in that case can be found using the techniques developed in Basov
and Bardsley (2005).
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